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Does PID solve the moral 
problems of prenatal 
diagnosis? A rights 
analysis, 
Deryck Beyleveld 
Introduction 
Preimplantation diagnosis (PID) and prenatal diagnosis (PD) can both be used 
to prevent the birth of a child with a genetically inherited condition or defect. 
When used for such a purpose, the chief moral advantage generally claimed for 
PID over PD (where PID is possible and practicable) is that PID does not 
involve terminating a pregnancy. 
This will not impress those who believe that a biologically human being has 
an inviolable `right' to life from conception, but it does recommend PID to 
those who believe that the embryo achieves this status only at the moment of 
implantation. And, even for those who believe that the fetus is owed no 
protection for its own sake at any stage, it recommends PID on the ground that 
deliberate abortion should be avoided because of the trauma and risks to the 
life and health of the mother involved. 
Are we to conclude that PID is an ethical advance over PD? We need to be 
cautious. The permissibility of abortion is not the only moral issue raised by 
PID or PD. In general, genetic selection in reproductive choice raises the 
central issue of eugenics, viz., `What are permissible grounds (if any) on which 
to select for or against genetic characteristics? '; and against PID there is 
widespread suspicion that, even if PID is preferable to PD on anti-abortion 
grounds, PID is more suspect than PD on the issue of eugenics. 
Opposition to PID (vs. PD) on the issue of eugenics seems to rest on the 
conjunction of two claims (or sets of claims): 
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I PID will (more than PD) facilitate or even encourage selection for or 
against genetic characteristics that are irrelevant to the possession of moral 
status. 
II To select for or against genetic characteristics that are irrelevant to 
possession of moral status is immoral. 
Whether or not Claim I is true is an empirical question, and in this paper I 
will restrict my attention to Claim II (which is equally relevant to germline 
gene therapy), and I will try to assess it within the context of the Principle of 
Generic Consistency (PGC). 
The PGC grants rights explicitly to the generic features of (or capacities for) 
agency to all agents and prospective purposive agents (PPAs). A conceptus is 
before birth (and, indeed, for some time thereafter) not a PPA, but at most a 
potential PPA. The PGC does not grant generic rights to potential PPAs' and 
it is contentious to suggest that it imposes any duties on PPAs not to harm 
potential PPAs just because they are potential PPAs. The entire matter of 
duties owed to potential PPAs is complex, and for present purposes I shall just 
assert that there are at least some cases in which it is morally permissible to 
prevent the further development of a conceptus (whether already impregnated 
or not). More specifically, I would argue that there are two unproblematic 
grounds on which the development of a conceptus may be prevented or ended. 
For the reason that the conceptus is incapable of developing into a PPA; 
For the reason that the conceptus has known properties that mean that either at 
the unborn stage or after birth it will compromise the generic capacities for 
agency of the parents (and especially the mother) against their will. 
In addition, presuming that the PGC does not grant protection to potential 
PPAs as such, there is scope for arguing that there is third permissible ground 
for preventing or ending the further development of a conceptus: viz., 
For the reason that the mother (in the case of an implanted conceptus) or the 
parents (in the case of a not yet implanted conceptus) simply does not wish 
to have a child. 
In the context of the PGC (and other theories that make agency the central 
property for the possession of full moral status, i. e., of rights), II maintains 
II' (All things being equal) it is morally impermissible to select for or against 
PPA irrelevant characteristics (characteristics that are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for a being to acquire or maintain the status of a PPA). 
IF, in turn, entails that it is (all things being equal) impermissible to prevent or 
end the further development of a conceptus. 
For no reason other than that the mother (in the case of an implanted 
conceptus), or the parents (in the case of a not yet implanted conceptus), 
does not want to have a child with (or lacking) particular characteristics X, 
i. e., does not want to have a child having characteristics Z- where 
possession of Z is compatible with a child having the status of a PPA (the 
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genetic characteristics of the conceptus being such that they will, or are 
likely to, result in a child with characteristics Z). 
Is II' a valid derivation from the PGC? 
There are, in principle, two kinds of arguments that can be used to derive IF 
from the PGC. 
A Those that attempt to establish that assent to the PGC logically entails 
assent to IF. 
B Those that attempt to establish that selection for or against PPA irrelevant 
characteristics tends to facilitate or encourage PGC violating circum- 
stances. 
Arguments of type A 
If the PGC imposes at least a prima facie duty on PPAs not to kill potential 
PPAs as such, then II' will be a valid derivation from the PGC. In such a case, 
PPAs will owe such a duty to a potential PPA simply by virtue of the potential 
PPA being a potential PPA, because to select against a conceptus simply for 
the reason that it has (or lacks) characteristics irrelevant to its ability to become 
a PPA will be to deny that being a potential PPA is sufficient to impose a duty 
of protection on PPAs. 
However, I am not persuaded that the PGC grants such prima facie 
protection to potential PPAs as such. If this presumption is correct, then, if II' 
is to be derived logically from the PGC, this form of argument must show that 
to select for or against PPA irrelevant characteristics is to deny PGC protected 
rights of full PPAs as such. 
How about the following argument? A potential parent who wishes to select 
against a child having (or lacking) PPA irrelevant characteristics X (i. e., 
having Z characteristics), in effect claims 
(a) `I do no wrong by selecting against a conceptus with Z characteristics. ' 
Therefore, 
(b) `My PGC protected autonomy is violated if I am compelled to become a 
parent of a PPA with Z characteristics (when this can be prevented). ' 
Therefore, 
(c) `The mere existence of PPAs with Z characteristics against the choice of 
their parents (irrespective of how they behave) - whose existence could 
have been prevented - violates the generic rights of their parents. ' Z 
Therefore, 
(d) `The mere existence of a PPA can violate the generic rights of another 
PPA. ' 
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(e) The PGC, however, grants equal rights to all PPAs, reciprocal to which it 
places equal duties on all PPAs. Thereby, it implies that any rights 
violation can be prevented by the observance of a duty, which (in turn) 
implies that the mere existence of a PPA cannot be a violation of the 
generic rights of another PPA. 
(f) However, (d) contradicts (e). 
(g) Therefore, selection against Z characteristics violates the PGC. 
How sound is this? If a type A argument can be made out, I believe it will have 
to proceed along something like these lines. This particular example, however, 
is invalid. The valid interpretation of `the mere existence of a PPA cannot be a 
violation of the generic rights of another PPA' in (e) is `a PPA cannot by its 
mere existence violate the generic rights of another PPA'. On the other hand, 
the valid interpretation of `the mere existence of a PPA cannot be a violation 
of the generic rights of another PPA' in (d) is 'PPAs who do not permit PPAs 
to select against Z characteristics violate the generic rights of those PPAs'. So 
interpreted, there is no contradiction between (d) and (e). For there to be a 
genuine contradiction, it must be read into (d) that it is those PPAs who have Z 
characteristics who are, merely by having Z characteristics, violating the 
generic rights of their parents. But (d), so interpreted, is not a valid derivation. 
And, of course, there is the converse possibility of arguing that the logical 
entailment strategy must fail. For example, the following case might be 
presented. Are not would be parents, in effect, trying to select for (or against) 
PPA irrelevant characteristics simply by choosing particular partners to mate 
with? The only difference between selection by traditional mating choice and 
selection through PID or PD is the inefficiency of the former. If so, unless we 
suppose that mating should be at random, it cannot be intrinsically immoral to 
select for or against PPA irrelevant characteristics. 
This, however, is also fallacious. The effect of mating partner selection is, 
indeed, genetic selection for or against various PPA irrelevant traits. But, while 
mating choices cannot be illegitimate just because they have such an effect (it 
is, after all, impossible for there not to be such an effect), it begs the question 
to maintain that to mate with someone specifically in order to produce children 
with specific PPA irrelevant characteristics is legitimate. 
Arguments of type B 
Whether or not it is possible to produce a valid argument of type A, arguments 
depending on contingencies are also available. I will cite just two examples. 
1 Although the presumed permissibility of selecting against Z characteristics 
may not logically imply that PPAs with Z characteristics are of lower moral 
status than PPAs without them, imagine a child with Z characteristics who 
knows that its parents would have selected against these characteristics if 
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they had been able to do so. Imagine, further, that it is now possible and 
accepted as legitimate for the parents to select against Z characteristics. 
And suppose, as well, that the parents have now had another child whom 
they have ensured will not have Z characteristics after genetic diagnosis. 
Will this not be deeply damaging to the self esteem of the child with Z 
characteristics, in a way that the PGC will not permit? In addition, will not 
acceptance of the legitimacy of selection against Z characteristics tend to 
produce a sense of grievance in parents who, for whatever reason, are 
unable to avail themselves of new selection technologies against Z 
characteristics - thereby tending to cause (albeit irrational) resentment 
against those of their children with the offending Z characteristics, and 
thereby resulting in such children being treated with less PGC required 
respect than they would have been treated with had they not had these 
characteristics? 
2Z characteristics are, in themselves, neutral under the PGC, which is to say 
that no intrinsic rights benefit is to be gained by selecting for or against 
them. However, fashions can develop for such characteristics. Many such 
fashions are harmless in themselves. However, if they come to be regarded 
as conditions meriting medical intervention, they cease to be so. Witness 
the example of the desire for perfectly shaped teeth that has swept the 
United States, resulting in children whose parents are unable to afford the 
treatment that can correct `imperfections' that are now perceived of as 
deformities, suffering deep traumas as a result. By extension, it may be 
argued that permitting selection against Z characteristics, even if this is (ex 
hypothesi) not intrinsically prohibited by the PGC, is likely to produce a 
culture in which the possession of PGC neutral characteristics becomes 
generically harmful to those who possess them. 
Many at least prima facie plausible arguments of this kind can, I am sure, be 
produced. I would caution only that they point to a need for empirical research, 
which must be carried out if rational evaluation rather than dogma is our aim. 
Conclusion 
Although all of this is very tentative, I suspect that no intrinsic argument 
against selection directed at PPA irrelevant characteristics can be constructed. 
Thus, the force of rights based arguments against such selection practices 
(whether in the context of PID or PD - or germline gene therapy for that 
matter) will necessarily be contingent, being of the form that such and such 
practices are likely to produce situations more generically harmful to PPAs 
than the absence of such practices. 
On the other hand, on the basis of such arguments against selection practices 
that are directed at PPA irrelevant characteristics, the question of whether PID 
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is to be preferred to PD (assuming that, as a means to genetic selection, PD's 
involving killing a fetus, does not constitute an overriding objection against it) 
is a matter of whether or not PID is more likely than PD to promote such 
selection. And then, even if PID proves to be more problematic than PD on 
such grounds, PID will still only be the more problematic all things considered 
if, amongst other things, the eugenic advantages (as measured by the PGC) of 
PD over PID are greater than the advantages of the avoidance of abortion in 
relation to the disadvantages involved in the traumas of in vitro fertilisation. 
All of this is very complex indeed. Apart from deep analysis of the 
weightings to be accorded various consequences by the PGC, much of such an 
assessment requires empirical research. Such analysis and research will, 
however, have to be performed if a fully reasoned PGC inspired analysis is to 
be provided. 
Notes 
1 Simply because these are claim rights, which require the rights bearer to be 
able to waive their benefits, which presupposes that the rights bearer is a 
PPA. 
2 The possession of some PPA irrelevant characteristics in their children 
(such as having cystic fibrosis, or Down's Syndrome) might (and does) 
place greater burdens on parents. As such, would be parents can claim that 
they have a right to select against these characteristics. Not to do so will 
interfere with their generic rights when they are not willing to bear these 
burdens. However, these burdens are contingent, in that they could be 
avoided or considerably lessened by a supportive state and culture. The 
PGC relevant negative consequences for the parents are not functions of 
their children possessing the PPA irrelevant characteristics alone. 
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